"Minimal energy would be that required to provide food, water, shelter, and access to medical care. Civilizations require more. People need to be educated; funds are needed for arts, humanities, sciences, and for recreation and entertainment. Life should be joyful, and music, dance, and the graphic arts don't come energy-free. If people have such limited energy available that they can only focus on teh bare necessities of life, they don't ahve time to think about who to vote for, how to organize and run a political campaign, go to town meetings, and so on--the things that we take for granted but are necessary for a democracy. Thus it also may be that democracies benefit from, or even require, more than the minimal energy required for the barest human survival."
- Daniel B. Botkin, Powering the Future: A Scientist's Guide to Energy Independence (2010)
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Krugman Still Doesn't Get It
By Alex Trembath and Devon Swezey. Originally published at the Breakthrough Institute Blog.
Yesterday, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman published a blog post repeating his insistence that a carbon price is the key (if not the only) incentive needed to unleash "the magic of the marketplace" and drive innovation in clean energy technology. It was reminiscent of the conventional wisdom of the climate community over the past decade, and reflective of Mr. Krugman's own typically neoclassical views on the economics of climate change. Unfortunately, Mr. Krugman (and most climate policy advocates) continues to get the story wrong on clean energy innovation.
In the spring of 2010, Krugman wrote a widely-read piece in the New York Times Magazine called "Building a Green Economy," which pondered why, if anti-environmentalists are so adamant in their free-market faith, do they not support a price on carbon dioxide emissions. A carbon price, in Krugman's estimation, would serve as a signal to the market, driving innovation in cleaner technologies to the point where they achieved price parity with fossil fuels.
Since publishing his original article, cap-and-trade has crashed and burned. The prospect of pricing carbon emissions in the United States is effectively zero for the foreseeable future, but Mr. Krugman is still pushing a carbon price as the key to unlocking a clean energy future. On his blog, he noted the successful innovation in fossil-burning energy technology over the past century, and suggested that the only thing standing in the way of renewables achieving the same innovation path is the lack of a carbon price.
To his credit, Krugman acknowledges the need for new innovation in clean energy technology, a view that would place him outside of the mainstream climate advocate's mantra that "we have all the technology we need and lack only political will." Yet in expressing his zeal for a carbon price, Krugman ignores the actual history of technological innovation. As research from the Breakthrough Institute has shown, the emergence of key technologies has much more often been the product of directed and sustained government investment than the result of price signals. Breakthrough's report, "Where Good Technologies Come From," demonstrates that most game-changing technological developments--from interchangeable parts to railroads to jet engines to microchips to the iPhone, GPS and the Internet--resulted from direct federal investments in research, procurement, and deployment, often in active partnership with private industry.
Krugman falls victim to an ignorance of technological history and the relative roles for technological "push" policies, like research and development, and demand "pull" policies, like a carbon price. As Robert Atkinson and Matt Hourihan of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explain in their report on carbon pricing, "truly disruptive innovation comes, not from price-based demand-pull, but from focused (and occasionally, not-so-focused) technology supply-push, in the form of research-driven technological development."
Indeed, if our goal is driving innovation in maturing clean energy technologies, a carbon price is not even the most effective demand-pull mechanism in our policy toolbox. To be sure, pricing carbon can increase demand for clean energy technologies, but it is not optimized to drive innovation in energy technologies. Krugman writes that aviation technology steadily improved through "experience and practical innovation," and that clean energy must do the same. But innovation in aviation and jet engines did not happen because the price of sea travel (the main substitute) increased. Rather, military procurement created a demanding customer relationship that constantly pushed the private sector to innovate and improve technology for military application.
Despite his enduring affection for a price on carbon emissions, there is no indication that Mr. Krugman's sensibilities would prevent him from embracing an energy agenda founded on government research and investment. Indeed, Krugman's New York Times colleague David Leonhardt has embraced a technology-first energy innovation agenda, recognizing that a carbon price will be more politically difficult and less effective in the absence of cheaper, more reliable clean energy technologies.
As the Breakthrough Institute has consistently advocated, there are multiple policies and institutions with great potential to drive investment and innovation in clean energy technology. Some, like the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy, are already in existence (if underfunded). Others, like a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA), are not. Overcoming the challenges presented by market lock-in of fossil energy infrastructure, engineering challenges of clean energy technology, and climate change demands a broad suite of policies, of which a carbon price is only a small (and not even the most important) part.
Mr. Krugman is no technologist, by his own admission. In yesterday's blog post, he referred to the engineering of wind technology as "not my field of expertise, to say the least." But if a political economist as influential as Krugman is to continue weighing in on the energy technology challenge, it would be appropriate for him to develop a literacy in the history of technological innovation. Ever the champion of publicly funded health care, Krugman should have great affection for the government policies and institutions that can more effectively build a green economy.
After the failure of the carbon-price-centric American Power Act last summer, and with austerity measures increasingly dominating federal policy, the prospects for a carbon tax in the United States remain very low. Without one, the case for an energy innovation agenda not only remains, it has grown stronger.
Alex Trembath is a Breakthrough Generation Fellow and Devon Swezey is Project Director at the Breakthrough Institute.
Yesterday, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman published a blog post repeating his insistence that a carbon price is the key (if not the only) incentive needed to unleash "the magic of the marketplace" and drive innovation in clean energy technology. It was reminiscent of the conventional wisdom of the climate community over the past decade, and reflective of Mr. Krugman's own typically neoclassical views on the economics of climate change. Unfortunately, Mr. Krugman (and most climate policy advocates) continues to get the story wrong on clean energy innovation.
In the spring of 2010, Krugman wrote a widely-read piece in the New York Times Magazine called "Building a Green Economy," which pondered why, if anti-environmentalists are so adamant in their free-market faith, do they not support a price on carbon dioxide emissions. A carbon price, in Krugman's estimation, would serve as a signal to the market, driving innovation in cleaner technologies to the point where they achieved price parity with fossil fuels.
Since publishing his original article, cap-and-trade has crashed and burned. The prospect of pricing carbon emissions in the United States is effectively zero for the foreseeable future, but Mr. Krugman is still pushing a carbon price as the key to unlocking a clean energy future. On his blog, he noted the successful innovation in fossil-burning energy technology over the past century, and suggested that the only thing standing in the way of renewables achieving the same innovation path is the lack of a carbon price.
"The point is that renewable energy like wind and solar has not gone through a comparable process of improvement -- yet -- because the incentives haven't been there. But once we get to the point where a carbon price makes these commercially viable, there's every reason to expect huge improvement over time through, yes, the magic of the marketplace."But Mr. Krugman neglects the substantial obstacles to a large-scale shift to renewable energy technologies, stemming from technical challenges related to intermittency of electricity generation, energy storage, and materials constraints. Contrary to what Krugman implies in his article, fundamental scientific breakthroughs are required to fully replace our fossil fuel infrastructure with clean energy technologies, a view shared by Nobel physicist and current Secretary of Energy Steven Chu.
To his credit, Krugman acknowledges the need for new innovation in clean energy technology, a view that would place him outside of the mainstream climate advocate's mantra that "we have all the technology we need and lack only political will." Yet in expressing his zeal for a carbon price, Krugman ignores the actual history of technological innovation. As research from the Breakthrough Institute has shown, the emergence of key technologies has much more often been the product of directed and sustained government investment than the result of price signals. Breakthrough's report, "Where Good Technologies Come From," demonstrates that most game-changing technological developments--from interchangeable parts to railroads to jet engines to microchips to the iPhone, GPS and the Internet--resulted from direct federal investments in research, procurement, and deployment, often in active partnership with private industry.
Krugman falls victim to an ignorance of technological history and the relative roles for technological "push" policies, like research and development, and demand "pull" policies, like a carbon price. As Robert Atkinson and Matt Hourihan of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explain in their report on carbon pricing, "truly disruptive innovation comes, not from price-based demand-pull, but from focused (and occasionally, not-so-focused) technology supply-push, in the form of research-driven technological development."
Indeed, if our goal is driving innovation in maturing clean energy technologies, a carbon price is not even the most effective demand-pull mechanism in our policy toolbox. To be sure, pricing carbon can increase demand for clean energy technologies, but it is not optimized to drive innovation in energy technologies. Krugman writes that aviation technology steadily improved through "experience and practical innovation," and that clean energy must do the same. But innovation in aviation and jet engines did not happen because the price of sea travel (the main substitute) increased. Rather, military procurement created a demanding customer relationship that constantly pushed the private sector to innovate and improve technology for military application.
Despite his enduring affection for a price on carbon emissions, there is no indication that Mr. Krugman's sensibilities would prevent him from embracing an energy agenda founded on government research and investment. Indeed, Krugman's New York Times colleague David Leonhardt has embraced a technology-first energy innovation agenda, recognizing that a carbon price will be more politically difficult and less effective in the absence of cheaper, more reliable clean energy technologies.
As the Breakthrough Institute has consistently advocated, there are multiple policies and institutions with great potential to drive investment and innovation in clean energy technology. Some, like the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy, are already in existence (if underfunded). Others, like a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA), are not. Overcoming the challenges presented by market lock-in of fossil energy infrastructure, engineering challenges of clean energy technology, and climate change demands a broad suite of policies, of which a carbon price is only a small (and not even the most important) part.
Mr. Krugman is no technologist, by his own admission. In yesterday's blog post, he referred to the engineering of wind technology as "not my field of expertise, to say the least." But if a political economist as influential as Krugman is to continue weighing in on the energy technology challenge, it would be appropriate for him to develop a literacy in the history of technological innovation. Ever the champion of publicly funded health care, Krugman should have great affection for the government policies and institutions that can more effectively build a green economy.
After the failure of the carbon-price-centric American Power Act last summer, and with austerity measures increasingly dominating federal policy, the prospects for a carbon tax in the United States remain very low. Without one, the case for an energy innovation agenda not only remains, it has grown stronger.
Alex Trembath is a Breakthrough Generation Fellow and Devon Swezey is Project Director at the Breakthrough Institute.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Energetics Cliff Notes - Tuesday Edition
Despite my recent obsession with Google+ coverage and Bay Area BART protests, I found time this week for energy news as well.
- My colleagues and I are researching the coming clean tech crash, as subsidies and tax incentives for renewable energy technology expire. As Devon Swezey recently wrote in Forbes, "The global clean energy industry is set for a major crash. The reason is simple. Clean energy is still much more expensive and less reliable than coal or gas, and in an era of heightened budget austerity the subsidies required to make clean energy artificially cheaper are becoming unsustainable."
- Australia, against all odds, has passed a carbon pricing scheme. Leigh Ewbank of Beyond Zero Emissions digs into the new policy, noting that a the CO2 price will require auxiliary policies to drive real innovation and deployment of clean energy technology.
- A new report (PDF) from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explains why ARPA-E is such a vital resource and should be fully-funded. "Cutting ARPA-E's budget would thwart future successes. A smaller budget would mean fewer projects, a more narrow range of risky projects, more hesitation to explore uncharted ares, and fewer opportunities to attract private sector investment."
- Tomorrow (July 13) the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institution is hosting (and webcasting) an event called "Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment." The event signals the release of a new report on green jobs and a new database. Follow along on Twitter (#cleanecon) tomorrow morning.
- I enjoyed this piece on energy storage technology at The Energy Collective. "The enthusiasm for grid-connected energy storage is well-founded. The inability to store electric energy on the grid is, in many respects, the technological limitation that defined the design of our national power grid in the early 20th Century and that continues to account for its basic architecture today. The ability to generate electricity, to store it economically in large quantities, and to use it at a later time, would be the most disruptive technology to emerge on the power grid in the past 100 years."
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
March of the Elites: Why Grassroots Organizing Can't Save the Climate
Originally published at Breakthrough Generation.
The campaign to avert cataclysmic climate change soldiers on. Despite an aggressive global economic crisis that unequivocally stole some wind from the sails of climate action, the movement lingers, organizing marches and rallies for the coming climate revolution. But action on the climate-energy front will not occur at the grassroots level. Instead, advocates should focus on identifying the appropriate elites, whose influence and inclinations offer a potential pathway to progress on energy and climate change.
The movement to save the climate is unlikely to win with these tactics. In attempting to change the fact that the public doesn't care about climate change, the movement routinely forgets one important thing: the public doesn't care about climate change. Opinion polls indicate subsiding public concern over the future effects of climate change. A recent (and highly controversial) report by Matt Nisbett suggests that collective action and lobbying for the 2010 climate bill outgunned opponents from Big Coal and Big Oil, and the Kerry-Lieberman American Power Act didn't even get a vote in the Senate. Gallup shows that the public concern about the environment ranks last in a field of fifteen different national issues, a metric that the economy unsurprisingly dominates. Even if more and more people were coming around to the opinion that climate change is a real and dangerous phenomenon (which they aren't), that increasing swath of the population still wouldn't care too much about it.
And the truth is, the public doesn't need to care that much about it. Energy and climate policy is primarily institutional, technical, and scientific. It is much less socio-cultural. This makes sense, too: energy is a largely invisible and homogeneous commodity that competes on price alone. The public will use energy in the most cost-effective way possible, so the most logistically simple way to mitigate climate change is to make clean energy cheaper than carbon fuels. This goal will be achieved by policymakers, engineers, and entrepreneurs.
The solution to the climate-energy crisis is akin to the Manhattan and Apollo Projects and the creation of the Internet. None of these made use of mass public support or mobilization--indeed, the Manhattan Project was done in secret. Yet all were technical challenges with a national mission, accomplished by elites and contracted largely by the federal government, and with gargantuan social effects. No grand infrastructure projects are sexy products of some outpouring of public demand, yet the creation of the Interstate Highway System was perhaps one of the most significant achievements in the story of American commerce. These projects were accomplished by elite American patriots. Somewhere out in the masses of my generation, a team of elites is waiting to meet each other and make clean energy cheap and ubiquitous.The people standing around that team of elites, far greater in number, are not powerless. Effective climate policy will not be an all-out favoring of technocracy over democracy, but grassroots advocates need to understand the difference. Timetables and targets are even weaker technical plans than they are political strategies. A growing and vocal contingent in the developed world, dedicated to fixing the climate problem, means very little when 90% of new energy demand will come developing economies over the next century. Lifestyle choices--like consuming less, cycling to work, and switching out that 100-watt bulb--are infinitesimal compared to the challenge of decarbonizing fourteen terawatts of power. There are policies that can accomplish these ends: boosting research and development, driving technological innovation, subsidizing early-stage deployment, and empowering the next generation of scientists and engineers through education. But the grassroots section in this relay-campaign pretty much ends at advocacy, left to watch as elites carry the baton across the finish line.
The campaign to mitigate carbon emissions and revolutionize our global energy infrastructure will not be accomplished by the masses. It will not be accomplished by marches and emotive global demonstrations, even less so by eco-terrorism and violent disobedience. We will see this challenge defeated instead by a select group of elites: technicians and practitioners, experts and politicians. That's not a bad thing. As Aaron Sorkin says, elite is not a bad word; it's an aspirational one. How fortunate we would be if we could identify that team of patriots and elites who could lead us to a clean energy future.
The false choice in climate organizing
Hm...
Why I must choose between two ineffective strategies--one legal, the other not-so-much--is beyond me. More on this soon, but the campaign to "change the composition of the atmosphere" (as Bill McKibben puts it) will not be accomplished by grassroots organizing and/or semi-violent protest. Instead, it will be accomplished by an elite team of policymakers, engineers, and entrepreneurs, who approach the technical challenges of climate change and decarbonization and effect technical solutions.
UPDATE (7/5): Mr. Goodell graciously responded to this post in a short exchange on Twitter, in which he asserted I had misread his piece. There is not a false choice between "tame" and "subversive" climate politics, Mr. Goodell clarified; rather, there is room for both. I wouldn't say I misread his piece so much as I perhaps didn't make myself perfectly clear in responding to it. I agree, climate activists do not have to choose one camp or the other. A strategy to promote action on climate change can embrace both the tame and the subversive, much like the XL pipeline protest organized by Bill McKibben and James Hansen, which aims for civility yet warns its participants they might spend a night in prison over (Mr. Goodell uses this same example).
My point is that neither tameness nor subversion are effective pathways to successful action on climate change and decarbonization, because they frame the challenge entirely wrong. Action on climate change will not be accomplished by grassroots organizing, as was action on civil rights or earlier environmental issues. Rather, it will be addressed by elites, whose expert understanding of the technical challenges of climate change are matched by a strong government mission to re-industrialize the energy sector. See my latest post for more.
This question of how far to take the fight to stop global warming has haunted activists for years. But now that more conventional solutions, such as a global treaty to cut greenhouse-gas pollution, are dead, the issue is more pressing than ever. As the crisis grows, the temptation to turn up the volume with more dramatic and attention-grabbing protests will only increase. Climate activists often speculate about who will emerge as the Martin Luther King of the climate movement. But it may be equally relevant to ask who will emerge as the Malcolm X.This from a brief piece in Rolling Stone that mentions, and never explicitly admonishes, "a little guerrilla warfare against Big Oil and Big Coal." Jeff Goodell, the author, goes on to present a false choice when it comes to climate politics. They can either be tame, a la 350.org's Day of Action and the 'march on Washington' variety, or they can be more subversive, a little less civilly disobedient. Goodell seems to admire the efforts taken by activists lately, who "cut through fences and get smacked around by cops in riot gear."
Why I must choose between two ineffective strategies--one legal, the other not-so-much--is beyond me. More on this soon, but the campaign to "change the composition of the atmosphere" (as Bill McKibben puts it) will not be accomplished by grassroots organizing and/or semi-violent protest. Instead, it will be accomplished by an elite team of policymakers, engineers, and entrepreneurs, who approach the technical challenges of climate change and decarbonization and effect technical solutions.
UPDATE (7/5): Mr. Goodell graciously responded to this post in a short exchange on Twitter, in which he asserted I had misread his piece. There is not a false choice between "tame" and "subversive" climate politics, Mr. Goodell clarified; rather, there is room for both. I wouldn't say I misread his piece so much as I perhaps didn't make myself perfectly clear in responding to it. I agree, climate activists do not have to choose one camp or the other. A strategy to promote action on climate change can embrace both the tame and the subversive, much like the XL pipeline protest organized by Bill McKibben and James Hansen, which aims for civility yet warns its participants they might spend a night in prison over (Mr. Goodell uses this same example).
My point is that neither tameness nor subversion are effective pathways to successful action on climate change and decarbonization, because they frame the challenge entirely wrong. Action on climate change will not be accomplished by grassroots organizing, as was action on civil rights or earlier environmental issues. Rather, it will be addressed by elites, whose expert understanding of the technical challenges of climate change are matched by a strong government mission to re-industrialize the energy sector. See my latest post for more.
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Google can see the future
Google, whose energy initiatives and investments have always impressed me, yesterday released an energy innovation analysis that uses a model they built with McKinsey to forecast global power production mixes by different energy technologies in 2030. The analysis is available in a report [PDF] and interactive website that allows users to consider different potential energy mixes. Their technology pathways depend largely on breakthroughs and policies, the various combinations of which result in varying degrees of clean energy deployed in the future (#NoDuh).
Teryn Norris at Americans for Energy Leadership lauded the analysis and Google's willingness to bring energy innovation to the spotlight.
Teryn Norris at Americans for Energy Leadership lauded the analysis and Google's willingness to bring energy innovation to the spotlight.
[The] implication is loud and clear: U.S. policy should seek to unleash clean energy technology innovation as rapidly as possible...Google’s report is a much-welcomed addition to the debate that opens up a whole new lens for evaluating various energy policy proposals, and it offers a message that clean energy and climate advocates across the board would be wise to take seriously.Walter Frick at the New England Clean Energy Council has another take on Google's release, emphasizing that policy is an absolutely essential addition to technological breakthroughs.
Technology has an extremely important role to play. But policy that incents the development and deployment of clean energy and discourages the use and further deployment of fossil energy is also essential.It is very encouraging to see a major player like Google getting front and center in the global energy innovation effort.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
The upcoming brawl over energy subsidies
While Republicans hold the national debt increase hostage, Congress is deciding what to cut and what to gut (expansion or creation of new programs is largely off the table). Energy subsidies are already falling under the knife. Mark Muro at Brookings figures that if we're going to they're going after energy subsidies anyway, now is the time for real reform.
Defenders of oil and gas industry tax breaks are clearly finding it harder to maintain support for tax and other provisions for a mature, highly profitable industry whose incumbency essentially locks in U.S. economic vulnerability and energy dependency and inhibits the emergence of alternative energy sourcing . . . At the same time, though, legitimate questions are being raised about the nature and purpose of the major renewable energy subsidies and incentives.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
The trouble with tying climate science to policy
Some (not all) solar physicists are predicting a "solar lull," resulting in "a protracted downturn in the flow of [solar] energy to the Earth." Such a lull might produce slower accelerating GHG-forced warming, as less solar energy is refracted as IR radiation and trapped by the atmosphere. DotEarth has a good discussion of this still controversial decision, but I'd like to say two probably overly rudimentary things about it.
One, and this is probably excessively speculative, but I expect many climate activists would lament such a "solar lull," as their cause relies on sustained, notable, and predictable warming to advance a political message of whatever stripe (behavioral/lifestyle changes, climate treaties and government action, technological diffusion, etc.). This is silly. Relying on the coming apocalypse to advance your political action, and then lamenting when the apocalypse doesn't come, is actually a little shameful.
Two, even if I'm imagining the subset of climate activists who gleefully await cataclysmic climate events so that they can shout "I told you so!" to the deniers, there are still those who remain resistant to the idea of addressing the climate/energy problem. To them, decarbonization is directly tied to climate change (and not, or at least less so, to national security, economic growth, and political stability). Tying climate science and a political agenda together so closely works in such a way that, when conflicting science surfaces (as it often does), the motivation for action becomes muddied in an unnecessary way.
Even if this solar lull turns out to by an inaccurate prediction, my above reaction still works as a compelling thought experiment I think. Marginalizing climate science in the framing motive for action on decarbonization may seem to some activists like selling out or closeted denialism, but it seems increasingly clear empirically that tying climate science, a characteristically unstable and uncertain predictor, to this particular political agenda is at best only moderately helpful and at worst counterproductive.
One, and this is probably excessively speculative, but I expect many climate activists would lament such a "solar lull," as their cause relies on sustained, notable, and predictable warming to advance a political message of whatever stripe (behavioral/lifestyle changes, climate treaties and government action, technological diffusion, etc.). This is silly. Relying on the coming apocalypse to advance your political action, and then lamenting when the apocalypse doesn't come, is actually a little shameful.
Two, even if I'm imagining the subset of climate activists who gleefully await cataclysmic climate events so that they can shout "I told you so!" to the deniers, there are still those who remain resistant to the idea of addressing the climate/energy problem. To them, decarbonization is directly tied to climate change (and not, or at least less so, to national security, economic growth, and political stability). Tying climate science and a political agenda together so closely works in such a way that, when conflicting science surfaces (as it often does), the motivation for action becomes muddied in an unnecessary way.
Even if this solar lull turns out to by an inaccurate prediction, my above reaction still works as a compelling thought experiment I think. Marginalizing climate science in the framing motive for action on decarbonization may seem to some activists like selling out or closeted denialism, but it seems increasingly clear empirically that tying climate science, a characteristically unstable and uncertain predictor, to this particular political agenda is at best only moderately helpful and at worst counterproductive.
Thursday, June 9, 2011
The left-right climate trap
Out of Australia, a solid and succinct evaluation of the political difficulties of climate action:
HT to Environmental Economics.
People on the left instinctively believe in communal action, the role of government and the efficacy of international agencies such as the UN. They were always going to believe in climate change; it's the sort of problem that can best be solved using the tools they most enjoy using.Climate politics Down Under sound conspicuously similar to climate politics in the States...
The right tended to be sceptical about climate change from the start and for exactly the same reasons. It's the sort of problem that requires global, communal action, with governments setting rules. It is a problem that requires tools they instinctively dislike using.
HT to Environmental Economics.
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Quote of the Day: Economy-wide Efficiency
There's some conventional wisdom out there that the US economy has gotten considerably more energy efficient as a whole over the last few decades, with real GDP (US$) growing, while total energy consumption (quadrillion BTUs) fell. This story is often used as evidence against the prevalence of rebound, or the phenomenon through which consumption of a particular energy service increases as technology enables more efficient delivery of said service. If rebound is such a significant effect, skeptics refute, then why do we observe economic growth with decreasing energy consumption at the economy-wide level? Solar Feeds has one particularly strong explanation:
Now, there is a popular myth that has grown up in the past two decades the the US economy already transformed itself. This received wisdom holds that GDP rose while energy consumption per unit of GDP fell. That is certainly true in the narrow sense. But, not true in the broader sense. Here’s why: US domestic energy consumption which at one time was devoted to industrial production here in the US, is now simply offshored to Asia. The US economy still demands large units of energy which we simply import through manufactured goods. Worse, US GDP accounting still overweights consumption. This makes for a perverse, energy-accounting outcome: the more we offshore energy-consuming manufacturing to other countries, the more distorted our energy efficiency claims become, against GDP.For more on the rebound effect, check out "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena," (PDF), a report on the subject published by the Breakthrough Institute.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)